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Introduction
We have come to the conclusion, after close study,
after much suffering, after much consideration,
that if we cannot live as people, then we will at
least try to die like men.
So declared one of the inmate spokesmen during
the uprising at Attica in September of 1971. It is
irrelevant how many included in the "we" concurred; it matters not that it was said to the
cameras. That simple statement encapsuled the
intolerable frustration of the slave trapped in an
apparently hopeless situation.
The Attica inmates had crossed the threshhold
separating two unacceptable alternatives: to continue in inhuman conditions or rebel and risk death.
It may well be that there is a point below which
the human spirit refuses to sink further and, in
one last desperate, floundering an agonizing cry,
reaches upward in revolt in a vain effort to regain
lost humanity.
The McKay report is a fascinating book which
combines a variety of writing styles ranging from
the staccato of a police report to the eloquence of
literature. Although written as an investigative
report, this treatise will stand on its own with
sociology textbooks.
The Prison
Attica was created as a traditional prison during
the era of the silence rule and remained essentially
unaffected by even token reform efforts for decades.
In 1971, there was "no meaningful program of
education" and "idleness was the principal occupation." Staff members were neither equipped nor
* Professor of Sociology, University of Minnesota.

trained to communicate with the inmates and did
not consider it their duty "to understand or resolve
inmate problems."
As in most prisons, when the official power structure fails to provide rudimentary goods and
services, an informal system emerges. At Attica,
laundry rackets were common, homosexuality was
rampant, pornography and home brew were available from the other inmates. Inmates worked in the
metal shops (which produced an annual profit to
the state of $150,000) for the paltry sum of 30 to
500 per day. Two quarts of hot water were delivered to each inmate every morning but only one
shower was allowed each week. Food was inadequate and (according to the Commission) inedible
in some instances. Inmates were allowed one roll
of toilet paper every five weeks. The screen separating inmates from visitors was viewed as "senseless
harassment and dehumanizing."
I have two children and during the entire time I
was in Attica... I didn't have my children visit me.
If they want to see an animal, they can go to the
ZOO.
Inmates were forced to silently march to work
and to the mess hall with their hands at their sides.
They were prohibited from possession of "droppers" (electrical food heating elements) although
the inmate commissary sold items such as coffee,
tea and soup which required heating. One of the
mindless rules was a prohibition against chewing
gum. Another denied the inmate clothing with any
shade of blue because it was feared he "would
impersonate an officer."
I could not have those three pair of (blue) shorts
and one pair of (blue) pajamas because I violated
security by having blue underwear nobody could
see but myself.... How can you tell a grown man

that he is violating security by wearing a blue pair
of shorts? They actually think we believe that. You
know why that rule was made? For harassment
and for harassment only.
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A departmental rule book for inmates, published in 1961 and revised in 1968, states "Ignorance of the rules will not be accepted as an excuse
for violation." But "no rule books were distributed
to Attica inmates after November 1970."
The Commission describes the apparent necessity for inmates carrying knives to protect themselves from homosexual assaults because correctional officers made little effort to prevent rapes.
[The inmates] perceived themselves surrounded by
walls and gates, and tightly regimented by a
myriad of written and unwritten rules; but when
they needed protection, they often had to resort to
the same skills that had brought many of them to
Attica in the first place.
Reform Efforts
The New York prison system was re-organized
pursuant to reform efforts in July of 1970. "The
six prisons became 'correctional facilities' ... and
... old line correction prison guards awakened that
morning to find themselves suddenly 'correction
officers.' No one's job or essential duties changed,
only his title." However, "to a man spending 14 to
16 hours a day in a cell being 'rehabilitated' ... it
was scarcely any comfort, and no reassurance, to
learn that he was suddenly 'an inmate in a correctional facility'." Russell G. Oswald was appointed as Commissioner of Correctional Services
in January of 1971 and stated that his mission was
"to give the whole system a new flavor." He did.
His first reforms were in procedures already under attack in the courts. He liberalized visiting and
mail privileges, revised censorship and provided
inmates greater access to the media.
Some older inmates saw Oswald as "a great reformer." Some of the younger ones perceived the
changes as "costless placebos which ... left the
underlying, chronic conditions of imprisonment
unchanged." Corrections officers saw him as a "dogooder social worker" who was "pandering
criminals."
New parole procedures were intended as a "beneficial reform to promote rehabilitation. Instead, it
became an operating evil." The average time devoted by parole authorities to reading the inmate's
file and interviewing him was less than six minutes.
In March of 1971, Oswald established a committee at each institution to review incoming publications for acceptability. But, "The former censor
was designated chairman of the Attica media review committee."

In September of 1971, 60% of the Attica inmates
worked at jobs maintaining the institution, 20%
worked in the shops and 20% were divided between
various educational and training programs. One
of these "rehabilitation" programs was work release. Of the 2,243 inmates at Attica at that time,
six participated in the work release program earning between 250 and $1.00 per day.
In the spring of that fateful year, a group of
respected inmates decided to form a committee to
plan the annual 4th of July Independence Day celebration. Officers sat in on the several subcommittees since one of the stated purposes of the committee structure "was to break down the divisive
influence of the cliques and to involve officers and
inmates in a common enterprise." The recreational
activity was so successful that it was decided not
to disband six subcommittees but to have them
study ways of improving prison living conditions.
The committees proposed a "constitution" and a
plant to elect representatives from various segments of the inmate population into a single council. It was suggested that this group impose fines
for rule infractions in lieu of discipline administered
by correctional officers. "However, this proposal,
as well as the entire concept of a constitution, was
rejected by the correction staff."
But the inmates did not abandon efforts to seek
peaceful change in the institution. "By the summer
of 1971, an inmate-instructed sociology class in the
school had become an informal forum for. ideas
about effecting change." There was a series of organized protests. An inmate manifesto setting forth
moderate demands "including a commitment to
peaceful change," was sent to Oswald and the
Governor in July of 1971. Inmates had agreed to
work within the system; had committed themselves
to democratic procedures; and did not strike.
In a concerted peaceful lobbying effort over
a period of months, they had been unable to effect
even such simple changes as clean trays from
which to eat in the mess halls, or more than one
shower a week during the hot summer months.
While the sociology class stimulated ideas, there
was no action component and it was disbanded for
the balance of the summer in early August.
Oswald went to the prison on September 2nd intending to respond to complaints but was called
away from the institution. Before leaving, he hurriedly taped a message for the inmates which was
played over the intercom. "I am sure you realize
that complete change cannot be brought about in
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just a short time.... We will continue to strive for
prison reform in a democratic manner."
I took my earphones off and all I could hear was
earphones hitting the wall and people hollering.
'That's a cop-out, that's a cop-out,' because he
didn't do nothing. All he said was 'Well, we would
like to do this and we would like to do that.' He
didn't so much as make one concession, such as
giving a man soap or giving a man an extra shower.
He did not make any concessions whatsoever.
The Commission later observed:
The rhetoric about rehabilitation could not, however, deceive the men brought together inside the
walls.... For inmates, 'correction' meant daily
degradation and humiliation.... Most inmates
could take showers only once a week.... In the
end, the promise of rehabilitation became a cruel
joke... the prison officials... became accomplices
inmaintaining the fiction that maximum security
prisons serve a useful purpose.
The only bright spots at Attica were two experimental programs available to less than 4% of the
inmates....
The New (?) Order
The riot "began as a spontaneous burst of violent
anger" on September 9th. During the next four
days there was a realignment of forces as two societies maneuvered for power. The result was a
counter-riot by law enforcement officers which
left eighty wounded, forty-three dead human
beings and $2 million damage to the facility.
Most of the inmates who later became leaders
and spokesmen in the yard apparently "were not
part of the first wave of violence and destruction."
The Muslims (who were viewed with suspicion and
distrust by the correctional officers) were "always
well-disciplined and continued to protect the
hostages."
After the original violence and the seizure of
hostages, the inmates set about establishing an
organizational structure to achieve their demands.
They fortified their defenses, stockpiled medical
supplies and rations, created a feeding operation
and appointed a police force to m'mtain order.
"Spokesmen" (not leaders) emerged to lead the
"democratic" revolt. The Commissi6n reports that,
"A frequent observation of inmates interviewed
was that, in many respects, the inmates' society in
D yard was arranged in the same way that the
authorities, against whom they were rebelling, ran
Attica."
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A doctor who treated injuries in the yard later
testified that: ... those people (inmates) were
fighting against a regimented society, a structured
society that they felt they couldn't cope with and
yet it was amazing in just a little three-day period
they set up an artifically structured society of their
own that was absolute tryanny.
There was a small group of men. . . between 12 and
25 maybe, that were really running the whole show
and they had their so-called security guards which
were really their working officers and the rest of the
men in the yard were just peasants. They really
had no rights and no voice and no anything.
So, instead of this democracy where everybody had
equal vote, they established a dictatorship of their
own and it was amazing how fast it came about.
This commentary calls to mind the evolution of
class structure in "Lord of the Flies." Man is a
creature of habit and if the world population is
one day reduced to two people after Armageddon,
there is little doubt that one will set about
promptly to subjugate the other.
Historically, it is not uncommon that revolutionary movements which are successful in overthrowing the "bad guys" seems inevitably destined
to adopt the trappings of the deposed enemy and
immediately organize committees, write constitutions and create an alternative bureaucracy not
unlike the one overthrown. With that day, the
revolution falters because, as Pogo said, "We have
met the enemy and he is us."
There was an immediate role reversal. The
officer hostages were stripped of clothing in the
initial take over. Obviously the hostage guards
had no contraband but the ceremony served the
need for revenge by subjecting the enemy guards
to the similar degradation experienced by the
inmates at the hands of the collective guard force.
The negotiators were not stripped because they
were presumed to be neutral. But they were subjected to a patdown search similar to the frequent
yard searches inmates must endure routinely.
After the prison was re-taken, another role reversal
occurred as the task force stripped the inmates
naked. This exercise was not only a role reversal
but served the additional purpose of being an overt
manifestation of presumed power. By the simple
act of the searcher searching the searchee the class
distinction and superior-inferior heirarchy becomes
abundantly, if non-verbally, dear.
The McKay report reveals that "Attica" was
not merely a riot which was suppressed with a loss
of life. If one ignores the horror of the event and
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views it as a Hollywood production, it takes on the
characteristics of a Laurel and Hardy comedy. The
errors in judgment, oversight and plain bungling
from the outset are legion. If the Attica story were
presented as action, it would be rejected by the
reader as lacking credibility. It is difficult to believe
that the monumental, cumulative stupidity surfaced without the benefit of an organized effort of
some "Committee on Chaos."
The commission does not attempt to place blame
on a single individual or event. This position is
probably not taken for lack of evidence or culpability but simply because if you put all the participants ... governor, commissioner, deputy commissioner, warden, correctional officers, police,
some negotiators, inmates and pilgrims ...together in a bunch, a 3-year-old child could heave
a rock in any direction and strike an accomplice to
the tragedy. (Two notable exceptions were the
National Guard and medical personnel.)
Even though Oswald agreed to the twenty-eight
demands, the crucial factor was that the inmates
"would have to trust in the good faith of Oswald
and the state to implement the reforms." Julio
Carlos, one of the first inmates to be interviewed
upon release subsequent to the riot, told of inmate
reluctance to accept Oswald's word.
The first time he came in (to negotiate with the
rebels), he told us a lie. We knew he wasn't gonna
come through, that he was going to promise and
promise and in a year's time he might bone up
with a little better food and books.
This lack of trust in Oswald was the basic reason the inmates wanted Governor Rockefeller to
come to the prison and publically endorse Oswald's
promises. For Rockefeller presumably had more
to lose and, as Oswald's superior, had the authority
to enforce the promised changes. He declined to
come even when urged by some of the negotiators.
The Commission stated that "the Governor should
have gone to Attica, not as a matter of duress or
because the inmates demanded his presence, but
because his responsibilities as the state's chief
executive made it appropriate that he be present
at the scene of the critical decision involving great
risk of loss of life, after Commissioner Oswald had
requested him to come."
The Counter Riot
During the rebellion, an amorphous group of
laymen pooled their ignorance about prisons and

became an ad hoc negotiating team. There were
over thirty members. According to Parkinson,
that number is more than twice the maximum
composition a committee can tolerate and still
reach a decision on anything. The Attica negotiators confirmed that hypothesis. Some made
speeches which raised hopes of the inmates over
the amnesty issue (which was never a remote possibility); others basked in their own rhetoric; and
others were simply overwhelmed. The role of the
negotiators were never defined.
"Neither the state nor the observers ever gave
the inmates a clear warning that an assault with
lethal weapons was imminent." Nonetheless, most
of the inmates later stated they were not surprised
by the shooting. "If they're shooting white college
students," one inmate said, "they certainly weren't
going to spare a group of black convicts."
The Commission concluded that "The uprising
constituted an insurrection against the very authority of the state, and to tolerate it was to concede a loss of sovereignty over the rebels." It was
obvious (to most) from the beginning that this
authority would eventually have to be re-instated.
In contrasting riot control procedures exercised
by the state police on the streets of Rochester with
that on the yards of Attica, Inspector John C.
Miller told the Commission that (in Rochester)
"we didn't consider them as criminals. They were
people." (emphasis added). The inference, substantiated by the record of the state police a*ssault,
was that the inmates were not people. The Commission noted that "... the holding of human lives
for ransom is wrong and only leads to more violence
and to a back-lash that makes change more difficult." The immediate "back-lash" was observed
during the counter assault when the police officers,
sworn to uphold the law, vented wrath and vengeance under cover of the law. Inmate fears of reprisal
action were justified by law enforcement officers
using illegal means to "correct" them.
- There are many dimensions to the Attica event.
One could discourse on Kunstler's raising inmate
expectations, holding out for them the option of
escape to a foreign country.., when he knew that
that option never existed. Or, one could comment
on Dunbar's carelessness with the truth regarding
the alleged throat-cutting and castration of hostages.
In deference to space requirements, it seems that
the focus should be on Oswald. He had the power.
He was in charge. Aside from his failure to act in
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time and his erroneous belief that reform is a
process of evolution, he made a rather serious error
in judgment by negotiating from a position of
weakness. The rebels demanded food and he gave
them food. They demanded water and medical
assistance and he gave them both. They demanded
media coverage and he sent the TV cameras inside.
They demanded he negotiate with them and he
went inside. They made another 28 specific demands and he conceded on all points.
Yet the art of negotiation assumes a bartering
atmosphere where each side compromises. And one
expects to gain something when giving up something. There is some danger of speculating in
hindsight but one wonders what would have
happened had he agreed to each demand only upon
the release of one more hostage....
Oswald soon lost the respect of the inmates and,
with that loss, Oswald forfeited his potential as a
significant force in reaching resolution of the conflict. In the process, he also lost the respect of the
correctional officers and the police agencies.
One also wonders if it ever occurred to anyone to
consider the use of tranquilizer projectiles on the
inmates. Such methods are used routinely in subduing large animals in zoos which are"on the rampage, have escaped or need treatment of one sort
or another. Perhaps if the zoo keepers had been
called out to quell the disturbance, instead of the
state police, forty-three men would still be alive.
An uprising in which inmates had demanded above
all that they be treated as human beings thus ended
with their being treated inhumanly ... the only
way to salvage meaning out of the otherwise senseless killings at Attica is to learn from this experience
that our Atticas are failures. The crucial issues
remain unresolved; and they will continue unresolved until an aroused public demands something
better.
Or, one might add, until such time as prison
administrators reject despotism as a lawless means
to deal with the lawlessness of the outlaws.
Commission Recommendalions
The Commission could not resist, and rightfully
so, the desire to go beyond a mere description of the
fact-finding and set forth seven recommendations
for re-direction of Attica, in particular, and prisons
in general. Four of the suggestions dealt with
parole, volunteers, custody and parole. But, three
of the principles were addressed to the heart of the
problem.., the prison environment only enhances
further irresponsibility on the part of the inmate.
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In composite form, the Commission's recommendations were:
If prisoners are to learn to bear the responsibilities

of citizens, they must have all the rights of other
citizens except those that have been specifically
taken away by court order.
The central dynamic of prison life is the relationship between inmates and officers.
The programs and policies associated with confinement should be directed at elevating and enhancing
the dignity, worth and self-confidence of the inmates, not at debasing and dehumanizing them.
... Social responsibility should be thrust upon
them, rather than discouraged, as it now is.

Thus, a group of laymen stumbled onto a basic
truth of prison reform which has eluded the professional penologists for nearly two centuries: Since
prisoners have irresponsibility in common, it would
seem desirable to assist them in acting responsibly
in order to interrupt the cycle of criminality. It is
equally apparent to the casual observer that a
dictatorship (the prison society) is probably not
the best training academy for students of democracy. In fact, the "dirty old convicts" of Attica
had similar thoughts in 1971 and started acting
responsibly until the prison administration perceived the threat to its dynasty.
Epilogue
At the time of filing its report, the Commission
pondered the question of what changes had occurred in the New York prison system within the
first year subsequent to Attica.
Despite vows of reform, appointment of commissions, and visits by legislators and special committees, there was no improvement in conditions at
Attica for months.
In March of 1972, the inmates were allowed to
elect a liaison committee to establish ". .. a formal
channel of communication with the institution concerning grievances and common problems."
But, the inmate grievance committee, while providing a forum for discussion of complaints, gave
inmates no sense of participation in the important
decisions affecting their lives.
Superintendent Mancusi resigned rather than
implement this plan. By August of 1972, one half
of the inmates on the committee had been transferred to other institutions, had quit or had been
released from prison.
Less patient inmates began asking what had become of the 28 points to which Oswald had agreed
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in D yard and began talking about their readiness
to risk their lives once again if change did not come.

Thus, the cycle of misunderstanding, protest, and
reaction continues, and confrontation remains the
only language in which the inmates feel they can
call attention to the system. The possibility that
Attica townspeople will again hear the dread sound
of the powerhouse whistle is very real.

Conclusion
Mancusi, Dunbar and Oswald have resigned.
Forty-three victims of Attica have been buried.
The rumbles of dissent are heard once more.
*

*

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINA. JusICE: AN

By Paul B. Weston and Kenneth
M. Wells. Pacific Palisades, California: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc., 1972. Pp. xii, 317.
$8.95.
Perhaps the most important observation to be
made concerning this book is that it effectively fills
a felt need. In the expanding field of criminal justice
education, there is a marked scarcity of suitable
course materials. All too often these consist of
Other Men's Flowers, selected anthologies culled
and arranged according to the purposes and prejudices of the editor. While such compilations are
not to be sneered at, it is refreshing to read an
originally authored approach to the vast terrain
embraced by the title of the work under review.
It is attractively presented, unpretentious and
instructive; what more can be asked of a basic,
introductory text-book?
The scope of the book is very ambitious; indeed,
it might almost have been sub-titled, "Criminology
from the legal perspective." It offers very much
more than an overview of the criminal justice
system, seen as a continuum from the police phase
through corrections. A striking feature is the
novelty of much of the subject matter, at least in
the combination presented. It is a most unusual
introduction that manages to cover, lucidly, causative factors in criminal behavior, the right to
counsel, organized crime, crime and publicity,
sentencing alternatives and a cost/benefits view of
criminal justice as a system. Especially interesting
is the presentation, as a chapter, of offender case
studies, although it would have been helpful had
the authors given some idea of the setting for which
these materials were compiled and used. The
chapter on corrections and rehabilitation is a wellstated outline of modem trends and goals and, is,
in itself, a useful guide to a subject on which few
really introductory materials exist.
Any review containing unalloyed praise must
surely be suspect, but the few criticisms that follow
are intended to improve a work which ought to
look forward to a long and useful life in print. There
INTRoDUCTiON.

*

*

*

are numbers of small proofing errors which mar a
book of this cost and quality, some of which reflect
upon the authors; Rickus (page 13), certainly did
not live "as late as 1954" and what follows is,
therefore, as incongruous as it is surprising. Some
of the chapter illustrations, seem a little inapposite
and one might wonder whether they have been
transposed? On a more substantive level, criticism
might be levelled at some-of the sources selected
for reference which are, presumably, intended to
orient the reader desirous of pursuing studies in
depth and to aid, as the authors put it, in "the
development of a personal library in law enforcement and criminal justice." Some of these, even
allowing for subjective prejudice, do not constitute
the "best evidence," while others have been superseded by recent materials, more compatible with
the work under review.
H. H. A. COOPER
New York University
AnvANcEn STvmrEs IN CR:NOLoGY. By Arthur N.

Foxe, M.D. New York: Tunbridge Press, 1972.
Pp. 91. $4.75.
This slim volume contains reprints of ten of the
author's papers which have been published since
1944 variously in Corrective Psychiatry,Archives of
CriminalPsychodynamics and the Journalof Criminal Psycwpathology.
Whether, as a collection or individually, these
materials constitute "advanced studies" is a moot
question. Most of the materials appear to be a
series of disconnected philosophical musings and
rambling observations about a variety of topics,
frequently within the same article. For example,
the lead article, "Attica and the United Nations,"
presents in sequence observations on Russia and
Hungary, ancient Attica, the Medical Correctional
Association, his hub caps being stolen, shop lifting,
welfare violators, tainted government, crime statistics, newspaper headlines, riots, prosperity,
areas of psychiatric interest, Supreme Court
justices, the President of France, Benjamin Rush
and the Declaration of Independence, twelve causes
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of the Attica riot, the third world and ends with
George Washington's will!
In fairness to the author, it should be pointed out
that most of the materials were given initially as
speeches, and as such, may have been presented
for their dramatic effect rather than for scholarly
content. As a basis for looking to see how far we
have to go in criminology, this short collection gives
us a reference point. For serious scholars of criminology, however, there is very little that this book
has to offer.
CHARLES L. NEWMAN

The Pennsylvania State University
THE POLICE ROLE AND JUvENILE DELINQUENCY.

By Richard W. Kobetz. Gaithersburg, Maryland:
International Association of Chiefs of Police,
Inc., 1971. Pp. xiii, 264. $5.00.
This book by the Assistant Director of the
Professional Standards Division of the International Association of Chiefs of Police is a gold mine
of information on the administration, organization
and operation of police departments insofar as their
role in the handling of juvenile delinquency, a
relatively neglected area is concerned. It is an
official publication of the Association and grew out
of a nationwide survey and training project supported by the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Administration of the United
States Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare.
No police department can any longer plead lack
of knowledge or absence of guidelines as a reason
for retarded development of its juvenile functions.
Here is a very practical and helpful handbook, full
of guidance, advice and experience on which to
draw. Though the pivotal role of the police in
juvenile cases has long been recognized, the area
has been neglected equally long. If anyone doubts
the importance of the police in this area, he should
remember that the police refer less than 50 per cent
of cases to the juvenile courts.
Although not divided as such, the volume can be
broadly conceived as having two parts: (1) a survey
of prevailing philosophy and practice of juvenile
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police work, and (2) instruction and guidelines for
developing juvenile police work. The survey is
based on a 73.9 per cent (1,471) return of questionnaires sent to 1,991 administrators of law enforcement agencies on the state, county and municilpal
levels. A wealth of information was garnered from
the returns, giving what is doubtlessly the largest
body of data extant on the practices and policies of
juvenile police work. The states were conveniently
classified into nine regions. There was good coverage on essential aspects of policies and practices in
juvenile police work.
The chapter headings are an accurately descriptive index of the coverage: "The Nature and Extent
of the Problem"; "An Examination of Contemporary Police-Juvenile Operations"; "Police Authority and Responsibility"; "Emerging Legal Considerations"; "Police Action in Juvenile Cases";
"Guidelines for Police Policy Formulation";
"Police Juvenile Units: Historical Development";
"Administration and Functions of Juvenile Units";
and "The Juvenile Officer and Community Relations."
There are six appendixes outlining curriculum
and training programs for different levels of juvenile officers. There is a very good bibliography, a
list of recommended readings, a table of cases and
a table of charts.
Perhaps the weakest part of the book is the first
chapter. The intent of this chapter is to relate
juvenile police work to a sociological perspective.
It seeks to look at social trends and changes, the
relation between crime and society, theories of
delinquency causation, cultural factors and so on
as these affect juvenile police work. Only in a superficial way are these theoretical considerations
brought to bear either in Chapter 1 or in the rest of
the volume. In all fairness, it should be pointed
out that, at present, no one has made a significant
beginning in making such connections. On the
whole, this is an important addition to the book
shelves of juvenile police personnel.
MICHAEL HAKEEM

University of Wisconsin-Madison

